Ion · Plato

[530a] Socrates: Greetings, Ion. From where have you come to visit us now? From your home, Ephesus?

Ion: No, Socrates. But from Epidaurus, from the festival of Asclepius.

Socrates: And do the Epidaurians hold contests of rhapsodes for the God?

Ion: Oh yes, and of other arts.

Socrates: What then? Tell us, what did you compete in? And how did you do?

[530b] Ion: I won the first-place prize, Socrates.

Socrates: You speak well; let us see to it that we win at the Panathenaic festival too.

Ion: This will happen, if god wills it.

Socrates: I often envied the art of the rhapsodes, Ion; for it is fitting for you, given your art, to have your bodies adorned and to appear as fine as possible, and it is necessary for you to spend time with many other good poets, especially Homer, the greatest and most divine of the poets. Memorising not only his verses, [530c] but his actual meaning, is a thing to be envied. And no one could ever become a good rhapsode if they do not understand what was being said by the poet. For it is necessary for the rhapsode to become an interpreter of the meaning of the poet, for those listening. But to do this well is impossible without having understood what the poet is saying. All these things are worthy of being envied.

Ion: You speak the truth, Socrates. For me, at least, this has given the greatest toil of my art, and I believe that I speak about Homer better than other men. Neither Metrodorus [530d] of Lampsacus, nor Stesimbrotos of Thasos, nor Glaucon, nor anyone else who has ever existed, was able to say so many fine thoughts about Homer as I.

Socrates: You speak well, Ion. For it is clear that you are not unwilling to demonstrate them to me.

Ion: For it is worth hearing how well I have adorned Homer, Socrates. I think I deserve to be crowned with a golden crown by the Homeridae.

Socrates: I shall find the time to listen [531a] to you later, but now tell me whether you are skilled only regarding Homer, or Hesiod and Archilochus too?

Ion: Only regarding Homer. For he seems adequate to me.

Socrates: Is there anything about which Homer and Hesiod say the same things?

Ion: I certainly think there are many.

Socrates: And would you be able to explain better the things which Homer says or which Hesiod says?

Ion: Equally both of them, [531b] Socrates, when they say the same things.

Socrates: But what about the matters where they do not say the same things? For example, about the art of divination, which both Homer and Hesiod have something to say.

Ion: Very true.

Socrates: And would you, or one of the good prophets, be better at explaining when these poets say things regarding divination that they both agree and disagree about?

Ion: One of the prophets.

Socrates: And if you were a prophet, and could explain what the two poets say when they agree, would you not know how to explain what they say when they disagree?

Ion: Obviously.

[531c] Socrates: So how is it that you are skilled only in Homer, and not Hesiod or any of the other poets? Or does Homer discuss different themes from all the other poets? Has he not discussed many things about war; and the conversations of people towards one another – good people, bad people, unskilled people and skilled people; and of the gods conversing with one another and with humans, how they interact; and of what happens in heaven and in the underworld; and the origins of gods [531d] and heroes? Are these not the things that Homer has written poetry about?

Ion: You speak the truth, Socrates.

Socrates: And what about the other poets? Do they not write poetry about the same things?

Ion: Yes, Socrates, but they have not written their poetry in the same way as Homer.

Socrates: In what sense? In a worse way?

Ion: By far, yes.

Socrates: And Homer has written in a better way?

Ion: Certainly better, by Zeus!

Socrates: And yet surely, dear friend Ion, when someone speaks better than other people on the subject of arithmetic, someone else will recognise [531e] that they are speaking well?

Ion: I agree.

Socrates: And will that person be the same person who knows when people speak poorly, or will that be someone else?

Ion: It will be the same person.

Socrates: And this will be the person who is an arithmetician?

Ion: Yes.

Socrates: When many people are talking about which foods are healthy, and someone speaks best, is it one person who notices that the best speaker speaks best, and another person who notices that the worse speaker speaks worse, or is it the same person?

Ion: Clearly it is the same person.

Socrates: Who is this person? What name do they have?

Ion: A doctor.

Socrates: Therefore, to sum up, we say that when many people are speaking about the same things, it is the same person who always notices when [532a] someone is speaking well and when someone is speaking badly. For if they do not notice when someone is speaking poorly, it is clear that they will not notice when someone is speaking well about the same topic.

Ion: Certainly.

Socrates: Therefore, is the same person skilled in both?

Ion: Yes.

Socrates: Therefore you say that Homer and all the other poets, which include Hesiod and Archilochus, speak about the same things but not in the same way, but that while one of them speaks well, the others speak worse?

Ion: Yes, and I am correct in saying so.

Socrates: Therefore, if indeed you know that someone is speaking well, [532b] then you would know that those speaking in an inferior manner do speak worse.

Ion: It seems so, certainly.

Socrates: Therefore, most excellent friend, we will not go wrong in saying that Ion is equally skilled in Homer and the other poets, since he himself says that the same person will be an equal judge of all those who speak about the same things, and that nearly all the poets deal with the same things.

Ion: What therefore is the reason, Socrates, that I, when someone discusses another poet, do not offer up [532c] anything to say and am wholly unable to throw together something of like value, and I simply doze off, but when someone mentions Homer, immediately I wake up and offer up an insight, and have plenty to say?

Socrates: This is not difficult to infer, friend, but it is clear to everyone that you are unable to speak about Homer with any art or knowledge; for if you could do it with skill, then you would be able to speak about all of the other poets; for poetry is a whole, is it not?

Ion: Yes.

[532d] Socrates: Therefore, when someone picks up any other art in its entirety, will there be the same method of inquiry for all of the arts? Do you need to hear me explain why I say this, Ion?

Ion: Yes, indeed, by Zeus, Socrates. I rejoice listening to you wise men.

Socrates: How I wish you were correct, Ion; but you rhapsodes and actors, and those people whose poems you sing, are the wise ones. I do nothing but speak the truth [532e] as a common citizen would. But even that which I just asked you: consider how trivial and commonplace what I have just said is, and how it is something that every man knows; that the method of enquiry is the same whenever someone picks up an art in its entirety. Let us take an example – is the art of being able to paint a whole?

Ion: Yes.

Socrates: And are there not many painters who exist now, as well as many painters who have existed in the past, who are good and bad?

Ion: Of course.

Socrates: Have you ever seen someone who was skilful in pointing out the brilliances and flaws of the art of Polygnotus, son of Aglaophon, but when it came to other painters, [533a] could not? And whenever someone shows off the works of other painters, they doze off, are at a loss and draw a complete blank, but when they want to give their opinion about Polygnotus or any other painter, and about that painter only, they wake up and offer an insight and have plenty to say?

Ion: No, by Zeus, definitely not.

Socrates: Or have you ever seen anyone who was involved with the art of sculpture, who is skilful [533b] in explaining the brilliances of the sculpture of Daedalus son of Metion, or of Epeius son of Panopeus, or of Theodorus the Samian, or of any other individual sculptor, but when it comes to the works of other sculptors they are at a loss and doze off, having nothing to say?

Ion: No, by Zeus, I have never seen such a person.

Socrates: And as I reckon, you have never seen any man involved with flute-playing or lyre-playing or singing to the lyre or rhapsody who is skilled in discussing Olympus, or Thamyris, or [533c] Orpheus, Phemius the rhapsode of Ithaca, but are at a loss and have nothing to say when it comes to the strengths and flaws of Ion of Ephesus’ ability to rhapsode.

Ion: I have nothing to dispute with you on this matter, Socrates; but I am conscious of this fact in myself, that I speak the best out of all people when it comes to Homer, and I prosper when doing so, and everyone else even tells me that I speak well. But I do not speak so well when it comes to other poets. Tell me why this is so.

Socrates: I see, Ion, and I will point out to you [533d] what I reckon the reason is. For it is not skill through which you speak well regarding Homer, but as I was just saying, a godlike power which moves you, just as in the stone which Euripides called a magnet, but which many others call the Heraclean stone. For this stone not only attracts iron rings, but also imparts a power to those rings whereby they too can attract things just like the stone, and [533e] attract other rings, so that a very long chain of iron rings, suspended from one another, hangs; and the power of that stone is suspended in all those chains. Just as this, the Muse herself inspires men, and through these inspired men a chain of other inspired men is suspended. For all the good poets of epic poems sing all these poems not through their skill but being inspired and possessed. And the same thing happens to the good poets of lyric poems, too. And just as those Corybantic worshippers [534a] who dance and are not in their right minds, so too are the lyric poets not in their right minds as they make these beautiful songs. But when they step into the melody and into the rhythm, they are in a Bacchic frenzy and are possessed, just like the Bacchic maidens who draw out honey and milk from the rivers all while they are possessed and they are not in their right minds. And the soul of the lyric poets does this very thing, which is exactly what they themselves say. For, as I am sure you know, the poets tell us that [534b] they bring us songs from the honeyed fountains, plucking them from certain gardens of the Muses, just as if they were bees, and they fly around just like this. And they speak the truth. For the poet is a light thing, and winged, and holy. And they are not able to compose poems before they become inspired and out of their mind, and their mind is no longer in them. And for as long as they keep their mind, no person is capable of composing poetry or utter oracles. In seeing that it is not through skill that they compose poetry and say many fine things about [534c] the deeds of men, just like you with Homer, it is through divine dispensation; each person is only able to compose good poetry about that which the Muse has forced upon them; one person will compose dithyrambs, another hymns of praise, another choral dance songs, another epic and another iambic verses; but each of them is no good with the other types of song. For they do not sing these songs through skill but through divine intervention, since if they knew how to sing well about one thing through skill, then they would know how to do the same about everything else; and because of these things, God takes away these men’s minds to use them as servants and [534d] as oracle singers and heavenly prophets, in order that we, who listen, know that these men, whose minds are gone, are not saying these utterances of such great worth, but that it is god himself chanting these things and through them he utters out unto us. Tynnichus of Chalcis is the strongest evidence for what I am saying. He never composed a poem which anyone would deem worthy to even mention, but then he wrote a paean which everyone sings, and is pretty much the best of all the songs, but he himself says [534e] “it is a discovery of the Muses”. In this case in particular, God seems to have shown, in order that we might not have any doubts, that these beautiful poems are not human creations made by humans, but are divine creations made by gods. And the poets are nothing other than interpreters of the gods, each of them possessed by whichever god has possessed them. And God shows us these things by purposefully singing [535a] through the worst poet. Do I not seem to be telling the truth, Ion?

Ion: Yes, by Zeus, you do. For somehow your words touch my soul, Socrates, and the good poets seem to me to interpret these things to us through divine intervention.

Socrates: And so you rhapsodes in turn interpret the works of the poets?

Ion: What you are saying is correct.

Socrates: And so you turn out to be the interpreters of the interpreters?

Ion: Absolutely.

[535b] Socrates: Now hold on, tell me this one thing, Ion, and do not hold back anything that I ask you; whenever you recite poems well, and you astound those in the audience, such as when you sing about Odysseus leaping up onto the threshold, revealing himself to the suitors and pouring out arrows at his feet, or when you sing about Achilles charging at Hector, or about one of the sorrows of Andromache, Hecuba or Priam, are you in your right mind in these moments? [535c] Are you not out of your senses? Does your soul, being in a state of divine inspiration, not think that it is really there at the events of which you talk, whether these events are taking place in Ithaca or Troy or wherever it may be that you are singing about?

Ion: What an unmistakable proof you have outlined, Socrates. For I shall speak to you without hiding anything. Whenever I speak of something sorrowful, my eyes fill with tears; and whenever I speak of anything frightening or terrible, my hairs stand on end with fright and my heart throbs.

[535d] Socrates: What then? Are we to say, Ion, that this man is in his right mind at that time, who, adorned in embroidered clothing and golden garlands, weeps at sacrifices and festivals having lost none of these things, or is afraid while standing among more than twenty thousand friendly people, with no one robbing him or wronging him?

Ion: No, by Zeus, certainly not, Socrates; he is not in his right mind, if the truth be told.

Socrates: And do you know that you do the very same things to many of those in your audience?

[535e] Ion: I know this only too well; for I always look down on them from my platform and see them weeping and staring in terror and being as astounded as I am at what is being said. I have to pay close attention to them; if I cause them to weep, I shall laugh while taking their money; if I cause them to laugh, I shall weep as I lose it.

Socrates: Do you know that the spectator is the final one of the rings, which I said take their power through one another from the Heraclean stone? And you, [536a] the rhapsode and actor, are the middle one, and the poet is the first; but through all these the god draws the power of people to wherever he wants, suspending the power from one another. And just like from that stone, there hangs down an enormously long chain of chorus-dancers and of dance-trainers, with each of them suspended from the side of the rings, which hang from the Muse. And while one of the poets hangs from the Muse, another hangs from another – we call this being possessed, [536b] which is nearly the same thing; for they are held – and from these first rings, which are the poets, others in turn hang from one another, and they are inspired, some by Orpheus, some by Musaeus; but many are possessed and held by Homer. Of whom, Ion, you are one, and you are possessed by Homer, and when someone sings the work of another poet, you fall asleep and are at a loss as to what they say, but whenever someone makes the sound of the song of Homer, you are immediately wide awake and your soul dances and you prosper in what [536c] you have to say; for not through skill or knowledge do you say what you say about Homer, but through divine dispensation and through possession, just like the Corybantic worshippers are keenly attuned only to that melody which belongs to the god by whom they are possessed, and for that melody they have plenty of gestures and words, while not giving any thought to others; in the same way, Ion, whenever someone mentions Homer you have plenty to say, but when someone mentions one of the other poets, you are at a loss at what to say; [536d] and the cause of this, which you ask me – why you have plenty to say about Homer, but not about the other poets – is that you are a formidable praiser of Homer not through skill but through divine dispensation.

Ion: You speak well, Socrates; however, I would be amazed if you could speak well enough to persuade me that I am possessed and mad when I praise Homer. I doubt you would think so either, if you heard me speaking about Homer.

Socrates: I would very much like to hear you, but not before [536e] you answer me this: out of the things Homer talks about, what exactly do you speak well about? For surely it is not absolutely everything.

Ion: I assure you, Socrates, there is nothing I do not speak well about.

Socrates: But surely you do not mean those things which Homer speaks of, but you happen to know nothing about.

Ion: And what are these things that Homer talks about which I do not know?

[537a] Socrates: Does Homer not speak about arts in many places and at great lengths? For example, about chariot-driving – If only I can remember the verses, I will repeat them.

Ion: I remember them, and I will say them.

Socrates: Tell me what Nestor says to his son Antilochus, where he advises him to watch out for the bend in the chariot race dedicated to Patroclus.

Ion: He says

“Lean yourself into the polished chariot [537b] gently to the left of the two horses; but goad the right-hand horse by shouting at it, and slacken its reins with your hands. And at the turning post let the left-hand horse come near, so that the hub of the well-made wheel seems to touch the tip of the post; but avoid grazing the stone.”

Socrates: That will do. Now as for these verses, who would be a better judge of what Homer says correctly and what he does not? The doctor or the charioteer?

Ion: The charioteer, obviously.

Socrates: Is that because they possess the appropriate skill, or is there another reason?

Ion: No, it is because they possess the appropriate skill.

[537c] Socrates: Therefore, has each art been assigned its own particular task by the god, so that it is able to judge it? For the things we know by the art of helmsmanship, we will not know through medicine.

Ion: Certainly not.

Socrates: And the things we know through the art of medicine, we will not know through the art of carpentry.

[537d] Ion: Certainly not.

Socrates: Therefore is this not the case with all the arts: That what we know through one art, we will not know through another? But before that, answer me this: Do you agree that one art is one sort of thing, and that another is another sort of thing?

Ion: Yes.

Socrates: Do you use the same method of judging as I do? Whenever there is one field of knowledge for a certain set of things, and a second field for different things, I call them two [537e] separate arts.

Ion: Yes.

Socrates: For if there were one field of knowledge of the same things, why would we say that one is one art and another is another, since it would be possible to know the same things from both? Just as I know that there are 5 fingers here, and you, just like me, know the same things; and if I were to ask you whether you and I know this by the same art of arithmetic, or by another one, you would surely say that it is through the same one.

Ion: Yes.

[538a] Socrates: Tell me then, that which I was intending to just now ask you: do you think this holds true for all the arts? That is, the same art requires us to know the same things, but a different art requires us to know different things.

Ion: That is what I think, Socrates.

Socrates: Therefore, someone who does not possess any given art will not be able to judge about what is said or done in relation to that particular art?

[538b] Ion: You speak the truth.

Socrates: Therefore, will you be a better judge than a charioteer regarding whether Homer speaks well or not in the lines you just recited?

Ion: The charioteer will be better.

Socrates: Because you are a rhymer and not a charioteer.

Ion: Yes.

Socrates: And is the art of the rhapsode different to that of the charioteer?

Ion: Yes.

Socrates: And if it is a different art, then there is a different field of knowledge about different matters?

Ion: Yes.

[538c] Socrates: And what about when Homer says that Hecamede, the concubine of Nestor, gives the wounded Machaon a mixed brew to drink; and he says:

“over Pramnian wine, she was grating goat’s cheese with a bronze grater; and beside it an onion as a relish to go with the drink.”

Now, which is in a better state to determine whether Homer speaks accurately or not here? The art of medicine or of rhapsody?

Ion: The art of medicine.

[538d] Socrates: And when Homer says,

“She descended into the depth like a lump of lead on a fishing line, which comes rushing with force along the horn of a farmyard ox, ferrying destruction to the ravenous fish.”

Shall we say that these things are a better fit for the art of the fisherman to judge, whether or not Homer speaks accurately, or the art of the rhapsode?

Ion: Clearly, Socrates, the art of the fisherman.

[538e] Socrates: Now consider, since you are asking me, if you were to ask me, “Since then, Socrates, you find in Homer what is fitting for each of these arts to judge, come find for me also the passages of the seer and of divination. What sort of lines is the seer fittingly capable of judging, to tell if they are well or badly written?” And see how easily and truthfully I will respond to you. For there are many such moments, especially in the Odyssey, when Theoclymenus, the seer of the sons of Melampus, addresses the suitors:

[539a] “You men possessed! What evil are you suffering? At night, your heads and faces and limbs are covered below, and a loud wailing blazes up, and your cheeks are wet with tears; the porch is full of ghosts, and the courtyard is also full of these ghosts rushing towards Erebus beneath the darkness; and the sun [539b] has perished out of the heavens, and an evil mist has spread across.”

And there are many such moments in the Iliad, too, for example at the fighting at the wall, where he says the following,

“A bird-omen came upon them as they were eager to cross over; a high-flying eagle hemming in the people on the left-hand side, [539c] carrying in its talons a monstrous, gory serpent, still alive and writhing; nor had it yet forgotten its lust for battle. For coiling back, the serpent struck the eagle holding it right on the breast near the neck; and suffering in pain, the eagle threw it away to the ground and dropped it into the middle of the crowd; [539d] and the eagle, having shrieked out, flew away on the blasts of the wind.”

I maintain that these are the sorts of passages that the seer should examine and judge.

Ion: And you are correct in saying so, Socrates.

Socrates: And you are also correct, Ion. Now come on, just as I picked out passages from the Odyssey and the Iliad which concern the seer and the doctor and [539e] and the fisherman, pick out for me, since you are more skilled than I in the works of Homer, passages which concern the rhapsode, and the art of rhapsody – passages which the rhapsode should be better than other men at examining and picking apart.

Ion: I say, Socrates, that all of them do.

Socrates: Surely you do not mean all of them, Ion. Or are you so forgetful? It would hardly be right for a rhapsode to be forgetful.

[540a] Ion: What am I forgetting?

Socrates: Do you not remember that you claimed that the art of rhapsody is different to the art of being a charioteer?

Ion: I remember.

Socrates: And did you not agree that since it is a different art, it knows different things?

Ion: Yes.

Socrates: So, therefore, by your own account, neither the rhapsode nor the art of rhapsody will know everything.

Ion: Except maybe for things like that, Socrates.

[540b] Socrates: And by ‘things like that’, you mean to say nearly everything except what belongs to other arts; but what sorts of things will the rhapsode know, since he does not know everything?

Ion: I suppose that he will know whatever a man and woman ought to say, and what a slave and a freedman ought to say, and also whatever a subject and a ruler ought to say, too.

Socrates: So do you mean to say that a rhapsode will know better than a helmsman what someone in charge of a vessel ought to say when a ship is caught in a storm at sea?

Ion: No, the helmsman will know best.

[540c] Socrates: Or will the rhapsode know better than the doctor what someone in charge of a sick person should say?

Ion: No, they will not.

Socrates: But will they know what a slave should say?

Ion: Yes.

Socrates: Suppose the slave is a cowherd. In order to soothe some cattle when they get out of hand, will the rhapsode know how to do that, and not the cowherd?

Ion: Certainly not.

Socrates: But will they know what a wool-working woman ought to say about the [540d] working of wool?

Ion: No.

Socrates: Will they know what a general ought to say when exhorting their soldiers?

Ion: Yes, the rhapsode will know these sorts of things.

Socrates: Well then. Is the art of the rhapsode that of the general?

Ion: I would know, at least, what a general ought to say.

Socrates: Perhaps you are skilled in the art of being a good general, Ion. If you happened to be skilled with horses as well as the lyre, then you would know when horses [540e] were being handled both well and poorly; but if I were to ask you, “With the use of which art, Ion, do you judge when horses are being handled well? Is it through being a horseman, or a lyre-player?”, what would you answer?

Ion: I would reply that it is through being a horseman.

Socrates: And if you judged that people were playing the lyre well, you would agree that you do this through your capacity for playing the lyre, rather than being a horseman.

Ion: Yes.

Socrates: And since you judge military matters, do you do this through virtue of being a general or a good rhapsode?

Ion: It makes no difference as far as I am concerned.

[541a] Socrates: How? Do you mean there is no difference? Are you saying that the art of the rhapsode and the art of the general are one and the same, or are two different things?

Ion: It seems to me that they are one and the same.

Socrates: So does the person who is a good rhapsode also happen to be a good general?

Ion: Very much so, Socrates.

Socrates: So therefore, the person who happens to be a good general is also a good rhapsode.

Ion: No, that is not what I think.

Socrates: But you do think that whoever is a good [541b] rhapsode is also a good general?

Ion: Certainly.

Socrates: And are you the best rhapsode in Greece?

Ion: By far the best, Socrates.

Socrates: And, Ion, are you the best general in Greece?

Ion: Be sure of it, Socrates; and that is from studying the works of Homer.

Socrates: Then how, for Heaven’s sake, is it that you are the best in Greece at being both a general and a rhapsode, but you go around performing as a rhapsode and not as a general? Or [541c] do you think that the Greeks need a rhapsode crowned with a golden crown, but not a general?

Ion: But Socrates, my city is ruled and commanded by your people and in no way needs a general, but your city, and also Sparta, would not choose me as a general; for you think you are perfectly capable yourselves.

Socrates: My good Ion, do you not know about Apollodorus of Cyzicus?

Ion: Who is this?

Socrates: Someone whom the Athenians often chose as their general [541d] despite being a foreigner; and also Phanosthenes of Andros and Heraclides of Clazomenae, whom, despite also being foreigners, the city also promoted to be generals and also other offices, once they had shown themselves to be worth something of merit; and would the city also not choose Ion of Ephesus as general and honour him, if he also shows himself to be worth something of merit? What then? Are you Ephesians not originally Athenians, and is Ephesus [541e] not inferior to any city? But, Ion, if you are telling the truth, that you can praise Homer through art and knowledge, then you are doing me a great wrong. You promised me that you have expert knowledge of the many and fine topics of Homer and claimed that you would recite them, but you are deceiving me, and you are very far from giving me a recital. You are unwilling to tell me what sort these topics even are, which you are so clever at, despite me pressing you all this time. You are exactly like Proteus, and you take on all sorts of forms and twist up and down, and in the end you escape from me, appearing under the new guise of a general, [542a] all to avoid demonstrating how clever you are when it comes to Homer. If you really do possess an art, then, as I was saying, by deceiving me after promising to display your knowledge of Homer, you are doing me a great wrong. But if you possess no art – if instead you are possessed by divine inspiration from Homer, and without actually knowing anything you say all these beautiful things about the poet, just as I said you did – then you do no wrong. Choose, therefore, how you want to be thought of by us: a dishonest man, or a divinely inspired one.

[542b] Ion: There is a great difference, Socrates: it is much better to be thought of as divinely inspired.

Socrates: Then this much better title is yours as far as we are concerned, Ion; you are a divinely inspired praiser of Homer, rather than an artful one.